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ABSTRACT
The relation "between energy and gross national product and the
potential for substituting capital and labor for energy are discussed,
Detailed data for the 1960's are analyzed to determine the relative
impacts of changes in technology, lifestyles, and income levels.
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ENERGY GROWTH IN THE U.S. ECONOMY*
INTRODUCTION
The emerging national policy of energy conservation is potentially in
conflict with another national goal of long standing: continuous material
economic growth.** In the past, growth in energy consumption and Gross
National Product (GNP) have been closely tied, except during periods of
rapid social and technological change. If both national goals are to be
realized simultaneously the mechanism for decoupling energy and economic
growth must be understood.
Our purpose here is to examine the historical relationship between
energy use and material economic growth as measured by growth in the Gross
National Product. We shall investigate the substitution of other primary
factors of production, (e.g. , capital and labor) for energy in order to
separate energy use from economic growth. Finally, we shall use the wealth
of detailed data available for two years, 1963 and I967, to explore the
causes underlying the 2U% increase in U.S. energy consumption during that
period.
*The authors wish to acknowledge the work Mr. Craig Foster of the CAC
Energy Research Group who was responsible for the data management and com-
puting for this analysis.
**The merits of each of these goals are debatable and beyond the scope of
this paper. On energy conservation see Freeman (197*0 ; on growth see
Nordhaus and Tobin (1970 ) and Daly (197*0.
Schurr, et al (i960) discuss this in more detail, noting aberrations during
periods of war, depression and the effects of automation.
++
In the long run, however, the two cannot be decoupled, and it is likely
that future energy availability and social attitudes will result in changes
to one of these goals.

ENERGY MP GNP
The historical relationship between energy and national product
is shown in Figure 1. It is presented as a ratio called energy
productivity, indicating the value of goods and services produced
per unit of energy consumed. The growth in energy productivity has
slowed to nearly zero in recent years , after a steady rise from 1920
to 1950. The behavior of this ratio in recent years has attracted
the attention of many researchers, most notably Netschert (1971).*
The period considered by Netschert (19^-7-1970) was characterized
by relatively small fluctuations, many of which might be attributable
to climatic conditions or to uncertainty in the energy and GNP statistics.
To effect a substantial decoupling of energy and GNP growth,
substantial changes in energy productivity are needed. For example, if
energy productivity could grow at 3% per year, the same rate of economic
growth could be sustained with zero energy growth. Alternatively, a
slower rate of economic growth could be sustained while actually
decreasing U.S. energy consumption. As a reference point, notice that
the "zero energy growth by the year 2000" scenario of the Ford Foundation
Energy Policy Project requires an average annual increase in energy pro-
ductivity of 2.27 % over a 25 year period.
The mechanism for changing energy productivity is apparent from
*See also Linden (1976)
**A 10 percent variation in space heating requirements is not unrealistic,
N0AA (1973). Since on the average 20% of U.S. energy use is for space
heating, a 12 percent fluctuation in energy demand is possible. In
addition, there is reason to believe that errors in the measurement of
energy consumption and GNP may account for variations of similar magnitude
(See Morgenstern, 1950). Note that most of the fluctuations in Figure 1
during the last 30 years would fit within a i5 percent envelope).

1920 1930 1940 1950 I960 1970 1980
Fig. 1 Energy productivity since 1920,
Source: Bullard (191 h)

\the relatively simple equation linking energy demand to four key variables:
E = £-y_ g P (1)
Here E in the energy use during a given period, P is U.S. population, g is
per capita GNP during the given period, y_ is a vector (whose elements sum to
l) of normalized dollar values of goods and services making up the GNP , and
e is a vector denoting the energy required, directly and indirectly, to pro-
duce a dollar's worth of each good and service. To decouple energy from GNP,
changes are necessary in y_, the market basket of goods and services (e.g. ,
lifestyles), or e_, the technology of producing goods and services, so as to
require less energy. Efficiency of production, as well as efficiency of
consumption (of goods and services) are equally important.
Examples of technological changes include not only the reduction of direct
energy inputs to a manufacturing process, but also the substitution of other
inputs: material, capital, labor, for energy. These are discussed in more
detail in the next section.
SUBSTITUTION OF ENERGY FOR OTHER FACTORS OF PRODUCTION
Buring the last twenty years, the price of energy has declined relative
to the price of capital and labor (see figure 2). Under such conditions,
the latter factors would be replaced by increased energy use on the part of
producers and consumers alike. Technological change^ however, appears to
have kept this effect from significantly influencing the energy-GNP ratio.
Substitution of labor for energy has characterized an even longer per-
iod. Automation in industry and commerce is perhaps the most visible example,
but there are many other less obvious instances, such as the replacement of
retail clerks by highly illuminated spacious shopping areas with energy
intensive self-explanatory packaging. The same substitutions have taken
k
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place in the home, in the form of labor saving appliances and synthetic
fabrics.
The substitution of energy for capital is more recent, but quite signif-
icant. Perhaps the best example is the inadequate insulation of buildings,
resulting from incentives to minimize the down payment on housing. Similarly,
many appliances with a low first cost have very inefficient electric motors.*
These trends might reverse as energy prices rise, with the ultimate sub-
stitution of capital for energy being the use of capital intensive solar
energy systems to replace consumption of conventional forms of energy.
The standard economic production equations relate output to various ex-
pressions involving the inputs of labor and capital, the primary factors of
production. Great attention is paid to the productivity of each factor: that
is, to how much of it is required to produce a unit of output; and to mar-
ginal productivity, the change in output with respect to a unit change in the
use of a factor.
The ratio of the marginal productivities for capital and labor equals the
ratio/of their unit prices. Thus, a time series for the average production
worker's wage divided by the cost of capital shows which factor is being sub-
stituted for the other. Such a series is presented in Figure 2. It indicates
that labor was marginally more efficient with respect to capital from the
period of the Great Depression until 1955- This implies that capital was
being substituted for labor. Since that time, the ratio has been rather
neutral.
Energy should also be considered as a primary factor of production be-
cause of its obvious physical importance in production processes. A time
*See Allen (197*0

series of the ratio of the cost of capital to the cost of a kilowatt hour
of electricity* is also shown in Figure 2. The data indicate neutrality
with regard to substitution until about 1955. Since then, the cost of capital
has risen much faster than that of electricity. This trend helps explain
the promotion of off-peak-period uses of electricity, such as electric heat
and exterior night lighting by electric utilities. It also helps explain
such things as the general tendency in the U.S. not to install adequate build-
ing insulation, the trend toward less-energy-efficient electric motors of
fractional horsepower, and the movement toward centralization by many in-
dustries. **
The most consistent pattern in Figure 2 is the wage-price of electricity
ratio. It grew by a factor of twelve in the forty years since 1935, in-
dicating a continous pressure to substitute electricity for labor.
The capital-electricity ratio shown in Figure 2 indicates that the rising
relative value of capital would be a deterrent to the substitution of machines
and electricity for labor. However, the share of the average production
dollar allocated to capital and electricity, to all energy for that matter,
is a small fraction of that going to labor.
ENERGY GROWTH FROM 1963 to 1967
U. S. energy demand rose 25% during this U-year period. In this section
we will attempt to attribute this growth to changes in each of the four
Electricity was chosen for comparison because it is almost totally available
for mechanical work, and represents the most logical substitute for labor.
The same conclusion results when the average price for all energy is used.
**Centralization allows full-time use of capital equipment which is capital-
efficient, but requires large transportation networks which are energy-
inefficient
.

variables of eq. (l). We focus on the years 1963 and 1967 because they are
the only ones for which a detailed energy input-output model for the U.S.
economy is available. The model, discussed in detail by Bullard and
Herendeen (1975) describes at a 360-sector level of detail the technology of
production and the mix of goods and services produced. At this level of re-
solution, the energy intensity (Btu required directly and indirectly per
unit of goods and services produced) is determined as a function of over
135,000 parameters describing the technology of production. Similarly, the
options for consumers to substitute competing goods and services having dif-
ferent energy intensities can be modeled at a meaningful level of detail.
As seen in Fig. 1, the energy/GNP ratios for the 2 years are not sub-
stantially different. In order to find out if there were offsetting changes
in technology and consumption patterns, the effect of each change was eval-
uated.
Expanding equation 1 we obtain
o
E + AE = eygP + AeygP + eAygP + eyAgP + eygAP + 0(A ) (2)
where the first term on the right hand side is the 1963 energy consumption,
and the next four terms represent the first order contributions of changes in
each of the four variables and the remaining terms indicate the higher order
interactions. Performing the calculation, it was found that the higher order
terms were negligible: the first order terms accounted virtually all of the
total 2k% increase in energy use. The results summarized in Table 1 show that
the technological and lifestyle changes were small and essentially offsetting
and the contribution of population growth was relatively small at 5%. Most
of the growth in U.S. energy demand could be attributed to growth in per
capita GNP (l8$).
The most significant lifestyle (consumption pattern) changes accounting
8

First-Order Effect
% Increase
in Energy Use
Technology - 1.2
Lifestyle 2.5
GNP/capita IT.
7
Population 5-0
Table 1. Elements of Energy Growth 1963-1967,

for the increased energy demand were purchases of more airline tickets, chem-
ical products, radio and TV equipment, and the increased use of electricity
in homes. The data show most products became less energy intensive (Btu/
$ worth) but it is not possible to separate this effect (perhaps due to energy
economies of scale in centralized production) from the possible increased re-
quirements for transportation of goods to final consumers.*
Figure 3 shows the energy and labor intensities of goods and services,
and how they changed from 1963 to 1967.** The chart has been corrected for
inflation, and shows that production of most goods and services required
slightly less energy and much less labor in 1967 than in 1963. These are the
results of changes in the producing sectors of the economy, consistent with
the long-term increase in the wage/energy price ratio shown in Figure 2.
Figure k is similar to Figure 3 except that electricity intensity is plot-
ted against labor intensity, showing that electrical energy was more generally
substituted for labor than was total primary energy. This substitution
effect increased the use of electricity by about 2.5 percent during the
period 1963-1967. This is not surprising because electricity is nearly
totally available for mechanical work.
Since energy prices were relatively stable during the period, it is likely
that the reduction in energy requirements resulted either from anticipated
increases in energy prices, or from technological change.
The rapid energy price increases experienced since the 1973 embargo
represent a significant departure from historical trends in the relative
price of energy. Based on these new prices, the Ford Foundation Energy
*This would show up as increased purchases of transportation services by
final consumers (a "lifestyle" change).
**Calculations based on methods described by Bullard and Herendeen (1975)
10
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Policy Project identified a set of energy conserving technological changes
which are economically feasible under present conditions. To ascertain the
relative magnitude of these changes, the model was used to determine what
energy demand would have been in 1967, had these technological changes been
in effect then. The resulting energy demand of U3.8 quads represented a 28$
savings below the actual energy use level.
The technological changes predicted by the Ford Foundation are not expected
to be fully implemented before 1985 however. This is due to the general comple-
mentarity of capital and energy and to the constraints imposed by the age struc-
ture of existing capital stocks. Since capital stocks, expecially in the
form of machinery, can be viewed as devices for converting energy into heat
or useful work, the complementarity of capital and energy will dominate short
run responses to energy availability. In the longer run, the two factors
are substitutable, as discussed earlier, and significant energy savings might
be accomplished.
OUTLOOK FOR THE FUTURE
It is important to recognize that changes in technology and lifestyles
are limited: there are thermodynamic limits to energy requirements for pro-
duction processes, and the elements of the lifestyle vector are constrained
to sum to unity. So long as per capita GNP and population increase expo-
nentially, these variables will dominate eq.(l)in the long run. Technological
and lifestyle changes can have significant impacts only during transition
periods. In this respect, the Ford Foundation study was somewhat misleading.
Their so-called "zero energy growth" scenario was characterized primarily by
technological and lifestyle changes occurring between 1975 and 2000. These
changes did sufficiently decouple energy and GNP growth to bring energy
13

growth to zero in the year 2000 while the 3.5% annual GNP growth was virtually
unahated. Figure 5 illustrates what the Ford Foundation scenarios would
imply for the long run if the prescribed changes saturated the potential for
energy conservation. The exponential growth of GNP would dominate, and the
net effect of switching to smaller cars, changing lifestyles etc., would only
he to shift the curve to the right. The dilemma is not unlike a dieter wishing
to limit calories and switching to low calorie food while increasing the
total quantity of food eaten. The calorie intake can be slowed only for a
short period while the composition of the diet is being changed.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Growth in energy consumption cannot, in the long run, be decoupled from
growth in material affluence. In a world with limited energy resources, there-
fore, it seems reasonable to expect an eventual transition to a state of
zero population growth where well-being is no longer defined in terms of material
flow rates. Because of the associated value-shift such a transition may
take generations to effect without significant trauma, and it is quite pos-
sible that the market will be incapable of providing signals through the
price system early enough to assure a smooth transition.
It is apparent from analysis of historical data that i) there have been
no incentives to substitute labor or capital for energy, ii) technological
and lifestyle changes during the 1963-19&7 period had a very small impact on
energy use, iii) the substantial rates of growth in population and material
affluence have required a matching growth in energy demand. Since energy
prices were relatively stable during the 1960's the data can tell us nothing
about the magnitude of potential energy savings that might be realized
lU

250 -
200
.—
*
3 • 1
H-
m
in
o
~ 150
>
e> i/
cc
u2
Pf/ <5K
100 £/<%>—
50 - vS PROJECTIONS
BASED ON 3.5%
'^HISTORICAL FORD INCREASE IN
DATA PROJECTIONS GNP/YEAR
r» i i i i i i
1950 I960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030
Fig. 5 Extension of the Ford Foundation's projections.
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through technological and lifestyle changes induced by energy price increases .
A prompt reversal of the historical trends in the price of energy re-
lative to labor and capital would send early signals through the market that
would be consistent with the inevitable value changes associated with the
transition to a less energy intensive way of life. In the short run these
relative price changes would provide incentives for substituting other factors
of production for energy, thereby attenuating the growth in energy use, as we
enter a period characterized by great uncertainties shrouding energy supplies:
the possibility of public rejection of nuclear fusion technology; the chance
that C0„ effects on the ozone layer may necessitate curtailment of fossil
fuel use; unforseen events on the international scene; etc. It is clear
that a sound national energy policy should include an instrument for control-
ling energy prices to internalize many of these costs and risks.
We suggest an energy tax as a means for resolving these problems. Work-
ing through the price system it would retain freedom of choice. Accompanied
by income tax reform, it need not be regressive. Accompanied by a program
for disseminating information about its intentions and impacts, it could be
quite effective. The key to its success lies in the formula for distributing
the revenues from the tax in a way that offsets the political reaction of
capital and labor interests. Since the initial increase in the relative
price of energy would be perceived as a reduction in the returns to capital
and labor, the first reaction of these interests would be to oppose an energy
tax. A more detailed description of these problems is given by Hannon (1975)
•
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